Health Impacts

Anthropologist Anna Bellisari argues that the routine consumption of contaminated or saline water by Gaza Palestinians contributes to deterioration of the overall health of the population:

The water crisis is very costly to Palestinians not only in the agricultural and industrial sectors, but especially in terms of public health, which depends largely upon adequate, safe supplies of domestic water. Water shortages and pollution are responsible for a major portion of the acute and chronic infections widespread throughout the Occupied Territories, and are likely to cause permanent health damage to a large segment of the population.⁸⁸

This conclusion is supported by a recent World Bank report, which suggests that inadequate and contaminated water supplies contribute to the high incidence of gastrointestinal and parasitic infections found in Gaza. There are no studies that provide decisive proof, but preliminary evidence suggests a causal link between scarce and contaminated drinking water and Gaza's high levels of infant mortality, infectious disease, hypertension, and other health-related problems.

If the salinity of Gaza's aquifer continues to rise, eventually its water will be undrinkable. Salinity levels of Gaza groundwater range from 650-3,600 ppm. The U.S. standard for drinking water is 500 ppm, and water over 1,000 ppm is considered saline. Sea water has a salt concentration of 35,000 ppm. A maximum physiologically tolerable level of salinity in drinking water cannot be identified; sodium intake in water must be considered as a component of overall dietary intake. Ten grams per day is the maximum recommended salt intake for adults who are healthy, well-nourished, and not predisposed to hypertension or other salt-sensitive disorders. This level is also based on the presumption that the individual has access to sufficient fresh water to flush excess sodium: at best, human kidneys can concentrate urine to 6 grams of sodium per liter of water. Sodium intake in excess of this level must be flushed in order to keep plasma sodium levels normal. It is recommended that people with hypertension or cardiovascular disorders (both of which are common in Gaza) should not exceed 20 ppm sodium in their drinking water. Anything above that level is considered a major salt component of their diet. ⁸⁹

Some experts think that high salt concentrations are already producing adverse health effects: "Gaza physicians are convinced that salty water is responsible for the high incidence of kidney and liver complaints among Gaza residents."⁹⁰ Salinity has also been linked to hypernatremia,⁹¹ thought to be responsible for a large percentage of "crib deaths" and early brain damage.⁹² In recent years, nitrate contamination of Gaza's drinking water has increased rapidly: in 1987, 84 percent of Gaza's drinking water wells were considered suitable for drinking in terms of nitrate levels; by 1994, not a single safe well remained.⁹³ Elevated nitrate levels are also suspected of contributing to infant mortality by causing acute anemia or "blue baby disease."⁹⁴ Severe cases can result in anoxia (oxygen deprivation) and death. Nitrates have also been linked to cancer and to increased incidence of spontaneous abortion, both in humans and in animals.⁹⁵

Gaza Palestinians are exposed to high fluoride concentrations in their groundwater and also in the fish and the tea that are staple foods. When consumed in large amounts, fluoride is toxic and contributes to ulcers, kidney failure, soft-tissue calcification, and skeletal and dental fluorosis.⁹⁶ The effects in Gaza of groundwater chemical pollution from fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides are hard to establish, because data on concentrations and health impacts are not available. However, studies in the West Bank show that absorption through the skin or ingestion of such chemicals can damage the nervous system.⁹⁷ Similar products and practices are used in Gaza, so it follows that similar impacts may be present there. While aquifer concentrations are probably not high enough to produce extreme results, we should not rule out serious health effects because of sustained lowlevel exposures.

The most prevalent and serious health problem in Gaza is infectious disease caused by waterborne bacteria, viruses, and parasites. These diseases largely result from poor personal hygiene and inadequate sewage disposal, which are, in turn, exacerbated by insufficient water for washing and waste removal.⁹⁸ Moreover, open sewers are common in urban areas. Thus in November 1994, heavy rains caused sewage to mix with freshwater supplies, producing an outbreak of cholera in Gaza City, with fifty cases and one death in a week.⁹⁹

Although this outbreak received widespread attention, infectious disease is common in Gaza: "The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, which operates clinics in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, reported that three-quarters of all clinic patients suffered from infectious diseases, which were responsible for 74 percent of all childhood deaths."¹⁰⁰ Intestinal parasites are prevalent. Researchers at Birzeit University found that 50 percent of Gaza children suffered from roundworms. However, according to Bellisari, these infections are often considered to be a fact of life rather than a pressing health concern, so many people may not seek treatment. Fungal infections and various other skin conditions due to poor personal hygiene are also common. These diseases are worst in refugee camps, where poor sanitation is magnified by overcrowding.¹⁰¹

The World Bank estimates that 7 percent of Gaza's GNP is allocated to health concerns, but there is little sign of improvement in overall population health.¹⁰² According to Bellisari, without clean and ample water supplies, disease will recur as fast as it is treated, and resources will remain focused on symptoms and not on prevention.¹⁰³ Thus, Gaza's health care system will remain overburdened, producing strain on the limited resources of the PA and frustration among patients and health care workers.¹⁰⁴

Agricultural Decline

Agriculture is key to Gaza's economy but has been in relative decline since the middle of the 1970s.¹⁰⁵ The percentage of the total workforce employed in agriculture dropped from 31.8 in 1968 to 18.3 in 1988. Between 1981 and 1991, per capita agricultural GDP dropped from approximately $5,235 to $4,330.¹⁰⁶ When considered by themselves, these figures could be interpreted as signs of economic growth: the decline of agriculture relative to other sectors of the economy, such as industry and services, is often a hallmark of a developing economy. However, in the case of Gaza, other economic sectors grew too slowly to absorb any significant percentage of labor moving out of agriculture. The overall result of agricultural decline in Gaza has not been economic development, but rather increased poverty and economic dependence on Israel.

Agricultural decline in Gaza is in part a result of water scarcity. Discriminatory allocation policies and the contraction and degradation of the water supply interact to produce significant reductions in crop yields. During the occupation, Israeli policy not only limited Palestinian water consumption for agriculture, but also restricted the cultivation of water-intensive crops. In some cases, Israeli authorities even uprooted Palestinian fruit trees: between 1973 and 1987, for example, about 700 hectares of citrus trees were uprooted in the Territories. To protect Israeli production from competition, exports from Gaza were heavily restricted; furthermore water resources were allocated to Palestinians on the basis of soil conditions and type of crop.¹⁰⁷ Today, production is heavily influenced by trade imbalances that have their roots in the occupation. While Israel restricts imports of Gaza crops that compete with Israeli produce, Israel sells freely in the Occupied Territories.¹⁰⁸ Israel exports "substantial quantities of fruits and vegetables at prices with which Gazan farmers have been unable to compete."¹⁰⁹ Previously a net exporter of agricultural produce, Gaza has been a net importer since 1984 (see Table 5).

Water scarcity and imbalanced trade have affected citrus production. The area under citrus cultivation contracted steadily from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Productivity per hectare also appears to have declined (see Table 6).¹¹⁰ In the late 1980s, citrus production accounted for only 20 percent of the value of agricultural output, down from 50 percent in the previous decade.¹¹¹ This drop in production has affected other sectors of Gaza's economy, such as processing. "Many orchards lie abandoned because water salinity is too high for the crop. Today it is uncertain whether Gaza citrus production can utilize the full capacity of a newly constructed orange juice production plant."¹¹²

Israel claims that agriculture in Gaza expanded under the occupation. The Israeli claim may be based on a steady increase in the area used for vegetable production: from 300 hectares in 1967 to 4,800 in 1985-86. While the output of all fruits, including citrus, has declined from a 63 percent share of total agricultural value in 1969 to 27 percent in 1990, vegetables have increased from 14 to 50 percent in the same period. Vegetable crops are less water intensive and more salt tolerant, but they are also less productive (particularly in rain-fed areas) and more labor intensive. Profitability of vegetables has suffered because some export markets (for instance, Jordan) have imposed annual quotas, and competition has increased.¹¹³

Water scarcity has also adversely affected grazing areas and animal husbandry. Although livestock increased its share of total agricultural value from 21 percent in 1969 to 30 percent in 1990,¹¹⁴ military constraints on land use and overgrazed rangeland have combined with water scarcity to limit real growth in this sector.¹¹⁵ The greatest growth has occurred in the area of poultry production; more profitable types of livestock, such as cattle and sheep, have remained comparatively limited (see Table 7).

In sum, water scarcity has hampered agriculture in Gaza, discouraged investment and forced many Gazans to look for off-farm work. Hydrologist Gwyn Rowley writes, "The net effect [of water scarcity] is that carrying capacities and herd sizes are diminished and crop outputs are reduced or fail and the population has to 'move on,' for example, with younger elements seeking employment elsewhere as in urban areas."¹¹⁶

Economic Decline

Industry now accounts for a larger share of Gaza's GDP than prior to the occupation, rising from 4.4 percent in 1965 and 1966 to 12.2 percent in 1990. But overall industrial growth in Gaza has been slow, well behind the pace of "similar" cases, according to the World Bank.¹¹⁷ As a result, labor has moved from agriculture to wage employment in Israel rather than into other sectors of Gaza's economy (see Table 8).

A recent World Bank report says that the increase in migrant labor during the occupation was simply a function of "pull" factors in Israel: "Following the occupation, major changes took place; Occupied Territories workers were allowed to seek employment across the 'Green Line' which ultimately created a massive drain of people out of the agricultural sector."¹¹⁸ This perspective neglects the "push" side of the process. While it is likely that the prospect of wage labor in Israel is attractive to some Palestinians,¹¹⁹ the lack of economic opportunities in Gaza also contributes to the movement of labor.

An exclusive focus on pull motivations also ignores the role that Israeli policy in Gaza played in creating the migrant labor economy. Policies that enforced low levels of water consumption made agriculture "a burden rather than a source of income and jobs." Restrictions on development in other sectors of the economy contributed to general stagnation. As a result, local job opportunities were rare, and by 1994 more than 140,000 out of 2 million Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had, at some point, worked in Israel.¹²⁰

The dependence on wage labor in Israel is a strong contributor to the current economic crisis in Gaza. If population growth and agricultural decline were responsible in large part for the territory's economic instability, Israeli border closures have triggered an economic debacle. In 1994 alone, closures produced an estimated loss of $400 million in earnings in the Occupied Territories.¹²¹ The impact has been proportionately greater in Gaza, which is much poorer than the West Bank. Prior to the intifadah, close to 70 percent of Gaza's workforce was employed in Israel. In January 1994, this number was 11 percent (see Table 9).¹²² Not only has the migrant labor economy collapsed, so too have the support services that grew out of it. The remainder of Gaza's economy has been unable to absorb this new wave of jobless Palestinians. Unemployment is currently estimated at 60 percent;¹²³ among working males, underemployment is around 38 percent.¹²⁴

Faced with the task of creating a stable political structure within a territory that has been in upheaval for decades, the fledgling PA found itself woefully ill equipped to deal with the additional burdens of an exploding population and a shrinking resource base. A little over a year after the signing of the Accord, initial elation had faded. "We can now go freely to the beach," one resident said, "but we have also never been so badly off in economic terms."¹²⁵ The hardship faced by Gazans perpetuated the long-standing resentment of Israel; it also contributed to the emergence of dissatisfaction with Arafat's regime.

Legitimacy and Control

The 1990s have been years of rapid change in the Middle East. Elements of the following analysis may therefore be quickly superseded by events. Yet it remains likely that unless an alternate source of fresh water is developed, water scarcity in Gaza will continue to place real constraints on economic development and threaten political and social stability. The Gazan case appears to support the hypothesis that environmental scarcity can simultaneously increase economic deprivation and disrupt key social institutions, leading to civil strife and insurgency.¹²⁶

To cause civil strife, economic crisis must be severe, persistent, and pervasive enough to erode the legitimacy or moral authority of the dominant social order and system of governance. System legitimacy is therefore a critical intervening variable between rising poverty and civil conflict. It is influenced by the aggrieved actors' subjective blame system, which consists of their beliefs about who or what is responsible for their plight.¹²⁷

While the majority of Gazans continue to hold Israel accountable for the conditions under which they live, it is clear that Arafat's administration is being held accountable as well (see Figure 2). The survival of the PA in Gaza rests on its ability to balance the dual objectives of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of Gazans and achieving the stability demanded by Israel. In these early years of autonomy, the latter objective seems to be the priority: Arafat's authority derives more from his police force as popular support for his administration wavers.

Figure 2: Threatened Government Legitimacy in Gaza

In major population centers, Palestinian police have replaced Israeli soldiers as the immediate source of authority. Arafat's ability to serve simultaneously as an effective administrator and as a nationalist icon is in question. Diaspora Palestinians see Arafat as a distant local leader who has lost the ability to represent their interests internationally; many Gaza Palestinians see him as an autocrat committed to a peace process that ignores their immediate economic needs. Arafat risks becoming a "Mr. Palestine increasingly disowned by Palestinians."¹²⁸

Opposition in the Diaspora

As the prominent Palestinian poet Mamoud Darwish has written: "The irony of history is that Israel has adopted the old Palestinian formula - namely, that no solution is possible without the PLO."¹²⁹ But the more loudly the Israeli government proclaims Arafat and Fatah to be its partners in the peace process, the more dissension arises within the ranks of the Palestinian nationalist movement as to whether the peace process legitimately represents the movement's interests. Certainly, as an umbrella organization, the PLO has always contained opposition groups; these include the left-wing splinter groups the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the People's Party (PPP) (formerly the Communist Party). Prior to the Accord, none of these groups questioned Arafat's legitimacy. Today, however, these parties, and even members of Fatah, are calling for a rehabilitation of the image of the PLO within the nationalist movement. Some believe this rehabilitation requires the movement to distance itself from Arafat.

Arafat's autocratic methods are one significant source of intraparty friction. He has continually delayed adopting a more democratic structure within Fatah. Party elections in Gaza were postponed after similar elections in Ramallah, West Bank resulted in the defeat of almost all Arafat appointees. Arafat has since overturned these results.¹³⁰ A 1994 meeting of the PLO executive became a protest against his leadership when only eight of eighteen members participated.¹³¹ Shafiq al-Hout, PLO ambassador to Lebanon, who resigned from the executive shortly after the Accord was signed, is a member of a newly formed opposition group called the National Coalition. "Arafat is simply irreformable," he says. "There is no alternative to the PLO. But how can we rescue this organization now hostage to Arafat and Gaza? We think that the way out is to get Arafat to choose between leading his National Authority in Gaza and Jericho or leading the PLO."¹³²

The direction of the ongoing peace talks with Israel is another cause of opposition. Many Palestinians fear that the power imbalance between Israel and the PLO at the bargaining table has translated into a series of agreements that protect Israeli interests without producing commensurable gains for Palestinians. The recent agreement on limited autonomy for the West Bank is a significant step forward; however, opposition groups within the PLO immediately labeled the agreement "a disaster" and expressed concern that the terms of transfer are flawed and heavily biased toward Israel.¹³³ Skepticism surrounds the upcoming talks on the "difficult" issues of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, water, the future of Israeli settlements, and the fate of Jerusalem. From the perspective of some Palestinian nationalists, Arafat appears to be bargaining from a position of tremendous weakness: having recognized Israel and renounced the Palestinian use of violence, he is seen as having given up the main source of Palestinian bargaining power. For many, Arafat has traded away the PLO's overriding goal of an independent state for all Palestinians in order to ensure that he maintains leadership in Gaza.

Opposition in Gaza

The dissension within the PLO has significant implications for politics within Gaza, as the organization no longer serves in any meaningful respect as a source of unity. Parties once united under the PLO represent themselves separately in Gaza, and popular support for the PLO is split among them (see Table 10). Palestinian allegiance to the PLO has translated into widespread support for Arafat; most Gazans still express great affection for Arafat as the unquestioned leader of the nationalist cause. This affection does not, however extend to the PA as a whole and, as a result, Arafat's position in Gaza is not secure. From the outset, many Gazans, especially those who fought in the intifadah, saw Arafat's administration as "outsiders." The years of PLO exile resulted in a leadership with weak ties to its constituents, as illustrated by the comments of one of Arafat's aides regarding the "uneasy" return of the PLO to Gaza: "We're scared? . We don't know those people and they don't know us."¹³⁴ Some of the policies pursued by the PA since the transfer of authority have done little to bridge this gulf.

Arafat's patronage system has created suspicion that international aid is being misallocated. The PA says that less than 20 percent of a promised $2.1 billion in aid has actually reached Arafat's administration. Of this sum, the majority has undoubtedly gone to meet the payroll of the PA's vast bureaucracy of 20,000 soldiers¹³⁵ and 28,000 civil servants,¹³⁶ with the result that little remains for investment in infrastructure and development. There is widespread resentment of the PA's financial agenda: "We know that Arafat gets money, but we don't know where it goes, into his pocket or to his friends. We don't see any of it."¹³⁷

The exclusion of the majority of Gazans, and especially veterans of the intifadah, from political structures has exacerbated these grievances. The transition to limited selfgovernment has only slowly provided a nonviolent channel through which Gazans can express their political will. The achievements of the peace process, significant as they are, do not in themselves provide a stable long-term basis of support for Arafat's government.

While Fatah maintains majority support within Gaza and the West Bank, significant elements of opposition are evident. The PA's weakened legitimacy at first appeared to increase support for "radical" Islamist groups. Tensions between the PA and Islamists came to a head in November 1994, when sixteen died and two hundred were wounded in an eruption of hostilities between Arafat's police and supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.¹³⁸ In August 1995, an estimated one thousand protesters again violently confronted Palestinian police who were trying to arrest suspected Hamas leaders.

Incidents of this scale are not regular occurrences in Gaza, but political unity under the PLO has disintegrated; factionalism is rife as the realities of life under limited autonomy take shape. A major factor producing support for the Islamists is the ongoing economic crisis of the territory. It is simplistic and misleading to ascribe popular support for Islamist groups to the religious fervor of Palestinians within the territories or to a "global" expansion of Islam.

Three main Islamist groups operate in the Occupied Territories: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Tahrir. An elitist, ideologically oriented sect, Tahrir is not significantly involved in Palestinian politics. Islamic Jihad is notorious for several recent terrorist attacks. It focuses almost exclusively on violent action rather than on expanding its popular base in Gaza and the West Bank. Thus it is Hamas that is the major political threat to Arafat's PA.¹³⁹

Like Islamic Jihad, Hamas has become notorious since the Accord was signed for a series of suicide bombings against Israelis in both Israel and Gaza. Western media coverage has focused exclusively on these activities, which were conducted by the organization's military wing, OIzz al-Din al-Qassam. The media have not acknowledged what some have called the "other face of Hamas." There is a tangible basis for the group's popularity: it tries to provide some social and economic support for Gaza's population. Islamic groups are, by most accounts, relatively wealthy. In addition to significant contributions from the diaspora,¹⁴⁰ they are still able to obtain funds from Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf states that cut off support to the PLO.¹⁴¹ In some communities, Hamas provides monthly allowances to poorer families and loans for medical expenses, education, and businesses. It has put in place a network of charities to support free hospitals, schools, orphanages, and clinics.¹⁴² While Arafat's political achievements have won him considerable acclaim, within Gaza, Hamas's social activities may have a more immediate impact on an impoverished population.

At one point in mid-1994, almost one-third of Gaza's population claimed to support Hamas.¹⁴³ While that percentage has since diminished considerably, Arafat recognizes the power of Hamas and keeps open a line of communication with the organization's moderate political wing. Some say this wing is adapting itself to become a legitimate party in future elections.¹⁴⁴

'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, however, has shown little interest in adapting to politics under the PA. The horrific, and muchpublicized terrorist bombings for which Hamas has openly claimed responsibility initially garnered considerable popular support in the Territories. The first few attacks were followed by massive rallies to commemorate the suicide bombers, who were held up as role models. Gazan children traded and collected pictures of the bombers like baseball cards. But such popular public endorsement has all but disappeared. The militants' activities are undermining support for Hamas as a whole: Israel's total closure of the Territories after each attack cuts off thousands of Palestinians from their livelihood, exacerbates poverty, and turns many Palestinians against the Islamists. This has not, however, translated into greater support for the PA; the fastest-growing percentage of Gazans is that which claims disillusion with all political parties.

Nonetheless, a poll in July 1995 indicated that 30 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza still supported the suicide attacks.¹⁴⁵ This suggested an Israeli policy of tight border restrictions may, in the long run, actually reduce Israeli security. By weakening Gaza's economic base further, increasing frustration, and undermining Arafat's legitimacy, such a policy will exacerbate grievances within Gaza, grievances that could eventually catalyze even greater violence against Israel.¹⁴⁶

Even if Israel were to completely close off Gaza, radical Palestinians would still have opportunities for violence against Israeli targets because of the continuing presence of settlements. These settlements occupy a significant amount of territory, and as the quantity and quality of Gaza's natural resources deteriorate, they may become the focus of additional violence. The relative luxury of the settlements - some have spacious lawns and swimming pools¹⁴⁷ - provides an immediate comparison point and a powerful source of resentment in light of the poor conditions faced by most Gazans.

Threats to the security of Israelis may, however, be less direct. As the presence of Israeli soldiers declines in autonomous areas of Gaza, the high levels of social frustration in Palestinian society may instead be focused on internal Palestinian targets, leading to more intra-Palestinian violence in the Territories (see Figure 3). Israel's insistence that Arafat suppress the Islamist movement in Gaza already is a major source of intraPalestinian friction. Israel is suspicious of the mass arrests of Hamas's supporters after each terrorist incident, as charges are rarely laid and as Arafat refuses to extradite suspects. Nonetheless, the sweeps - which often result in gun battles between the police and the Islamists have damaged Arafat's image in Gaza, and there have been calls for him to stop "hounding Hamas's holy fighters."¹⁴⁸ Recent accusations of human rights abuses and torture of Palestinians by the PA's secret services in Gaza and Jericho have further undermined the image of the administration.¹⁴⁹

Grievance has not, at present, been redirected from Israeli targets toward the Palestinian police on a significant scale. However, many young people in Gaza, having grown up under the occupation, have an entirely negative perception of authority.¹⁵⁰ The authoritarian actions and conspicuous consumption of the PA have done little to alter this perception. The PA risks being seen - especially among Palestinian youth - as the continuation of Israeli occupation.

At present, most Palestinians oppose the ascendancy of conservative Islamists. The lack of a widely acceptable alternative to Arafat's government has resulted in political apathy rather than political revolt. Now that the nationalist unity that endured for so long under the PLO has largely evaporated, many Palestinians are left with a sense of hopelessness. Dr. al-Masri writes:

Our own society is somehow committing suicide,...Look at our streets - we are neglectful of everything. There is a depression in this country. At social gatherings you hear people talking about basic needs, political and economic problems, but there is no mention whatsoever of the future.¹⁵¹

Figure 3: Dynamics of Violence in Gaza

Early 1996 provided a break in this atmosphere of political apathy in Gaza. On January 20, Palestinians in Gaza, West Bank, Jericho and East Jerusalem voted in the first Palestinian general elections. Turnout in Gaza was extremely high, estimated at 85 percent of registered voters. This showing was interpreted as a rebuff against Hamas, who had called for a boycott of the election process. Arafat, as expected, won an overwhelming majority - 88 percent of the vote for the presidency - and Fatah is expected to dominate the 88-member legislative council.¹⁵²

Amid the excitement surrounding the elections, several observers were cautiously optimistic about the difficult transition from authoritarianism to democracy now facing Arafat's government.¹⁵³ The elections will provide the PA with greater legitimacy if the legislative council provides an effective forum for open political expression and increased participation in the political process. If, conversely, the council is an inadequate mechanism to balance the power of the leadership, and opportunities for participation remained limited in the absence of improvements in living conditions, what once appeared to be unshakable Palestinian faith in Arafat will likely crumble.

Rapid population growth and intense agricultural activity in a region of scarce resources have combined with Israel's policies throughout the occupation to produce a potentially volatile political environment in Gaza. Today, the monumental task of achieving political stability is further complicated by the PA's authoritarian tendencies and Israeli policies of economic disengagement.

The interaction of severe supply, demand, and structural scarcities has constrained development and has contributed to the impoverishment of Gaza's population. Deteriorating economic and social conditions have produced collective grievance and violence against Israel and, more recently, against the PA. Solutions to the water crisis in Gaza will not in themselves solve the conflict. Nonetheless, steps toward the conservation and rehabilitation of the aquifer and the more equitable apportionment of the water that is available will be essential elements of a stable peace.

The Environment, Population and Security papers are maintained by the Peace & Conflict Studies Program at the University of Toronto. We welcome your comments.

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