*For their valuable help, we thank Patricia Atristan-Monserrat, George Collier, Richard Enthoven, Pablo Farias Campero, Michael Fuller, Neusa Hidalgo-Monroy, Declan and Patrick Hill, Ken Mitchell, James Nations, Ron Nigh, Karen O'Brien, Aimee Robinson, Dick Roman, Peter Rosset, Ian Rowlands, Druscilla Scribner, Evon Vogt and Phil Wheaton.

1. The recent Zapatista uprising takes its name from Emiliano Zapata, a leader of poor peasants at the turn of the century who led the Mexican Revolution from the south. The insurgency has invoked his memory to focus the minds of today's peasants in Chiapas on decades of oppression by large landowners and ranchers.

2. To achieve this goal, land availability and electoral reform have remained the key demands of the EZLN from the beginning of the insurgency. In one of his "declarations," Zapatista spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos presented a clear set of demands to President Ernesto Zedillo in twelve words: "work, land, shelter, bread, health, education, democracy, liberty, peace, independence, and justice."

3. See Andrew Reding, "Chiapas Is Mexico," World Policy Journal 11, no. 1 (spring 1994): 11-24, and Joseph Whitmeyer and Rosemary Hopcroft, "Community, Capitalism, and Rebellion in Chiapas" (draft paper, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, December 1995).

4. See Hilary French, "Forging a New Global Partnership," chap. 10 in State of the World 1995, eds. Lester Brown et al. (New York: Worldwatch Institute, 1995), and Greenpeace reports and popular discussion on the World Wide Web; for the argument that environmental degradation in Chiapas seriously affected agricultural production between 1982 and 1987, see Maria del Carmen Carmona Lara et al., Ecologia - Cambio Estructural en Chiapas: Avances y Perspectivas (Tuxtla Gutierrez, Mexico: Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas, 1988).

5. See George Collier, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas (Oakland, Calif.: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994); Neil Harvey, "Rural Reforms, Campesino Radicalism and the Limits to Salinismo," in Transformation of Rural Mexico 5 (La Jolla, Calif.: Ejido Reform Research Project, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1994); and "Chiapas: Challenging History," Akwe:kon - Journal of Indigenous Issues 11, no. 2 (summer 1994).

6. The latter growth rate is a conservative estimate, yet it is astonishingly high compared with other population growth rates around the world. Demographers generally accept a 4 percent annual growth rate as near the upper bounds of biologically possible human reproduction.

7. Luis Raul Salvado, The Other Refugees: A Study of Nonrecognized Guatemalan Refugees in Chiapas, Mexico (Washington, D.C.: Hemispheric Migration Project, Georgetown University, 1988), 13.

8. Ron Nigh and Felipe Vallagran, Personal communication, 25 May 1995.

9. World Bank, Mexico: Second Decentralization and Regional Development Project Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 19 August 1994), 1.

10. Harry Patrinos and Alexis Panagides, "Poverty and Indigenous People in Mexico," Akwe:kon - Journal of Indigenous Issues 11, no. 2 (summer 1994): 73.

11. The drilling activities of the national oil monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), in the northern municipio of Reforma have drawn people from neighboring municipios and from out of state. The region has seen its population increase from 6,136 in 1960 to 30,875 in 1990. Many of the most accessible oil reserves in Mexico are beneath the soils of Reforma and the Lacandon; consequently, the Lacandon will support a growing number of drilling sites and an expanding population of labor in coming years. See Roberto Thompson, Problematica Agraria y Politica Petrolera en Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas: Centro de Investigaciones Ecologicas del Sureste, 1983); Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Chiapas, Edicion 1994 (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, 1994), 35; and Steven E. Sanderson, "Mexico's Environmental Future," Current History, February 1993: 76.

12. See Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 8-9.

13. Jeffrey Wollock, "Globalizing Corn," Akwe:kon - Journal of Indigenous Issues 11, no. 2 (summer 1994): 57.

14. Hydroelectric energy from the Grijalva River is captured by a system of dams from Lake Angostura to its delta in the state of Tabasco. The dams have been responsible for the flooding of over one hundred thousand hectares of prime land in the basin. Further expansion of the dam system has not been possible, since peasant communities have increasingly anticipated relocation and mobilized opposition in time.

15. Salvado, The Other Refugees, 13.

16. In this paper, "marginal" land is land that is ecologically vulnerable; it is relatively susceptible to rapid degradation by erosion and overuse. It may be fertile and productive in the short term, but this productivity is difficult to maintain for more than a few years.

17. Analysts often inappropriately assemble and compare government census data in an effort to identify trends. Particularly in the case of Chiapas, marginal areas are often inadequately represented in these data or are given characteristics of neighboring communities. Political manipulation of municipio boundaries by the PRI hinders calculation of time-series data on environmental scarcity. In general, Chiapas data cover only some four million of the state's seven million hectares, or around 60 percent of the total. Thus, we stress trends in proportions and ratios; where census data must be used, we present as many alternative data sources as possible.

18. Rodrigo Medellin, "Mammal Diversity and Conservation in the Selva Lacandon, Chiapas, Mexico," Conservation Biology 8, no. 3 (September 1994): 780-99.

19. O. Mazera et al., "Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in Mexico" (manuscript, Centro de Ecologia, Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico, D.F., 1990); Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, as cited in Ronald Nigh, "Consecuencias de la Colonizacion Agropecuaria para las Selvas Tropicales del Sureste de Mexico: Implicaciones Regionales y Globales" (working paper for the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia Social del Sureste, 1994), 15. Some of the best evidence on the impact of deforestation is subjective. A recent study showed that a large majority of Chiapans believe that campesinos and indigenas are more seriously affected by deforestation than rancheros, the Mexican government, or people in other nations. See Lourdes Arizpe et al., Cultura y Cambio Global: Percepciones Sociales sobre la Desforestacion en la Selva Lacandona (Mexico, D.F.: Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias, 1993).

20. A. Cortez Ortiz, Estudio Preliminar sobre Desforestacion en la Region Fronteriza del Rio Usamacinta (Informe Tecnico, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, Mexico D.F., 1990), as cited in Nigh, "Consecuencias de la Colonizacion Agropecuaria," 15.

21. A. Cuaron, "Conservacion de los Primates y Sus Habitats en el Sur de Mexico" (master's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, Heredia, 1991), as cited in Nigh, "Consecuencias de la Colonizacion Agropecuaria," 15.

22. See "Maximo Lopez, Firewood Gatherer," American Forests, November/December 1988, 38, for anecdotal evidence of the impact of receding forests.

23. See Rattan Lal, Soil Erosion in the Tropics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

24. Olaf Erenstein, Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo, Private communication, 30 May 1995.

25. Neil Harvey, "Playing with Fire, the Implications of Ejido Reform," Akwe:kon - Journal of Indigenous Issues 11, no. 2 (summer 1994): 22.

26. Milpa agriculture is a traditional method of crop rotation among maize, beans or coffee, and fallow. In the Eastern Lowlands, despite the fallow period allowed by milpa production, land is still exhausted quickly.

27. Harvey, "Rural Reforms," 11.

28. A 1981 publication used LANDSAT images to generate soil erosion data for Chiapas; however, because of a typographical error, it is impossible to determine which year the data were collected. See Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Inventario de Erosion en el Estado de Chiapas mediante Imagenes del Satelite Landsat (Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos, Direccion General de Conservacion del Suelo y Agua, 6 March 1981). One study suggests that declining agricultural yields in Chiapas between 1982 and 1987 were caused by environmental degradation. However, this five-year period was marked by low rainfall, high currency inflation, and radical adjustment programs that better explain the sharp decline in yields, especially for small producers. The study neglected the effects of liberalized agricultural policy and structural scarcities; it is a good example of the hazards of not placing the analysis of environmental degradation in a political and economic context. See Carmona Lara et al., Ecologia.

29. Global Assessment of Soil Degradation, "North and South America," sheet 1 in World Map on Status of Human-Induced Soil Degradation (Wageningen, Netherlands: United Nations Environment Programme, International Soil Reference Center, 1990).

30. According to the maps, "moderate" degradation causes "greatly reduced agricultural productivity."

31. See George Collier, "Soil Erosion in Chamula," in Fields of the Tzotzil: The Ecological Bases of Tradition in Highland Chiapas (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1975), 121. See also Raul Garcia-Barrios and Luis Garcia-Barrios, "Environmental and Technological Degradation in Peasant Agriculture: A Consequence of Development in Mexico," World Development 18, no. 11: 1572.

32. Collier, Fields of the Tzotzil, 115.

33. Pablo Farias Campero, ECOSUR, Chiapas, Mexico, private communication, May 1995.

34. See David Pimentel et al., "Environmental and Economic Costs of Soil Erosion and Conservation Benefits," Science 267 (4 February 1995): 117-23, for an excellent review of the effects of soil erosion and its consequences for agricultural sustainability.

35. There are clear limitations to this use of the analysis of Pimentel et al. The most obvious is that they assume homogeneous terrain, whereas the Central Highlands and the Eastern Lowlands of Chiapas are extremely heterogeneous in elevation and soil type.

36. Pimentel et al., "Environmental and Economic Costs," 119; Maximiliano Huerta Cisneros et al., Caracteristicas Generales de la Vegetacion y Su Utilizacion en 25 Municipios de Chiapas (Chiapas, Mexico: Fomento de Corporacion de Chiapas, 1986), 16; Carmona Lara et al., Ecologia 28, 29; Olaf Erenstein, Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo, private communication, 30 May 1995.

37. Lal, Soil Erosion in the Tropics, 16.

38. Nigh, "Consecuencias de la Colonizacion Agropecuaria," 27.

39. Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos and Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe, Primer Informe Nacional sobre Tipologia de Productores del Sector Social (Mexico, D.F.: Subsecretaria de Politica Sectorial y Concertacion, 1992), 19.

40. Nigh, "Consecuencias de la Colonizacion Agropecuaria," 14.

41. Ibid., 12.

42. Marc Edelman, "Rethinking the Hamburger Thesis: Deforestation and the Crisis of Central America's Beef Exports," in The Social Causes of Environmental Destruction in Latin America, eds. Michael Painter and William Durham (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1995).

43. Average coffee yields in Canadas are under 300 kilograms per hectare, compared with the state average of over 500. Similarly, the average maize yield for the Canadas region is about 1,300 kilograms per hectare, but for the state it is over 2,000. A. Carlos Santos, "Development and Conservation of Natural Resources in the Las Canadas Region of the Lacandona Rainforest," in Population/Environment Equation: Implications for Security: Third Conference on Environmental Security, 31 May - 4 June 1994.

44. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," 5-40, especially 8-16.

45. "Land hunger propelled the Chamulas [indigenas] forward as much as did their talking stones and living Saints. The criollos of San Cristobal so dominated cultivable land in these high pine mountains that the holdings of Chamulas - much as they still are today - were measured in rows and not hectares." John Ross, Rebellion from the Roots, (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1994), 67. Pages 251-67 provide an excellent account of the role the jungle for Mayan and Chiapan history.

46. Eric Wolf, Peasant Revolutions of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 5.

47. Felipe Vallagran, "Forest Policies in Chiapas" (public communication to Oscar Gonzalez Rodriguez, Subsecretary of Natural Resources, Secretariat of Environment, 10 May 1995).

48. In 1974, a quasi-official committee of indigenas called the Indigenous Congress complained about injustices throughout the state: "We have problems with ranchers who invade our lands. . . . We need land, we don't have enough of it, so we have to rent it, or go away to work. The lands we have been given are infertile. We need to be taught our rights under the Agrarian Laws." Collier, Basta!, 63. For more on how state elites disrupted the land reform efforts of the Revolution, see Antonio Garcia de Leon, Resistencia y Utopia (Mexico, D.F.: Ediciones Era, 1985).

49. Ross writes: "The first wave of settlers were, like the 'new' Lacandones before them, Chol refugees pushed out of Palenque. They were soon joined by highland Tzotziles, squeezed off the undernourished soils of Chamula . . . . Non-Mayan Indians from Oaxaca, forced off their communal lands by government dams, arrived in the Desert of Ocosingo; indigenas [were] dislodged by the White Guards of southern Veracruz's murderous cattle kings, a regional industry sustained by World Bank credits; landless mestizo farmers from as far away as Guerrero and Michoacan joined the flow in pursuit of a patch on which to grow a little corn." Rebellion from the Roots, 255-56.

50. James Nations, "The Ecology of the Zapatista Revolt," Cultural Survival Quarterly, (Spring 1994), 32.

51. Logging interests have strong historical ties to state and PRI elites. When demand increased substantially after World War II, entrepreneurial effort was channeled into buying up land and working around the rules established by the Constitution. For example, by 1949 the firm Vancouver Plywood had pasted together a territory of 600,000 hectares by a system of name lending between families and contractors. In 1957 and 1961, presidential decrees granted various privileges to logging companies to facilitate the removal of precious hardwoods, such as mahogany, tropical cedar, oak, madrone, and pine. Then, in 1972, President Luis Echeverria Alvarez granted the small community of Maya Lacandon of the Eastern Lowlands - comprising only sixty-six families - communal title to a vast tract of over 600,000 hectares of the Lowlands containing much of the remaining Lacandon Rain Forest. The President and the state elites knew that this Mayan community would easily relinquish control of substantial portions of this land to rancheros and logging companies. He ordered the area's other occupants - campesinos and indigenas - to relocate to several larger communities or to move out entirely. Only after major protest by these occupants, who suddenly found themselves declared squatters, were some of their land titles recognized. Government relocation programs continued, however, and private loggers easily secured rights to extract the remaining hardwoods. In 1974, the Lacandona Forestal Company and Palenque Triplay Company were granted a concession of 1.3 million hectares of virgin, secondary and fragmented forest lands with permission to continue operations until 1986. Logging companies operating in the Lacandon were nationalized later that year, and operations were significantly expanded with public capital. Road construction into the forest increased again with a PEMEX study of the area's oil reserves. Although the Montes Azules Bioreserve was created in 1978, campesinos, rancheros and commercial loggers continued to push in to the rain forest. Thus, in the decades leading up to economic liberalization, competition for forest resources grew fierce as firms were forced to work further up the Usumacinta River and cut deeper into the forests: between 1970 and 1975, 314,000 hectares was logged; another 128,000 hectares was lost between 1976 and 1980. Ross, Rebellion from the Roots, 255; Vallagran, "Forest Policies in Chiapas."

52. Burbach and Rossett, Chiapas and the Crisis of Mexican Agriculture, 6.

53. Corporatism is the state's practice of absorbing social movements into its bureaucracy or party apparatus before they organize independently. Opposition is thereby confined to local and marginal political spaces, if it poses little threat, or it is eliminated entirely if it seriously challenges elites. In the current Mexican context, neocorporatism means the PRI's practice of negotiating with various opposition groups and economic sectors - especially labor, peasants, and private capital - to produce economic and political pacts that maintain social stability; importantly, the regime is not assured of getting everything it wants from this process. Neocorporatism is a process of co-opting sectoral and opposition leaders into the policy process and opening up a little political space for groups not aligned with the PRI. The concession is offered in exchange for support of the PRI's policies, and the arrangement is managed by commissions, committees, and other political institutions designed to contain political dissent at a high level and dissuade local protest. However, both economic sectors and opposition groups may still be subjected to repression, including harassment, imprisonment, and assassination by the police, army, and private armed forces. Groups are thus paralyzed by threats, by diminishing resources, and by a lack of leadership during crucial moments of political action. See Neil Harvey, "The Difficult Transition: Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism in Mexico," in Mexico: Dilemmas of Transition, ed. Neil Harvey (London: Institute for Latin American Studies, 1993); Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1991); Judith Adler Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1988), chap. 5; Frederick C. Deyo, "Economic Policy and the Popular Sector," in Manufacturing Miracles, Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, eds. Gary Gerefii and David L. Wyman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter Smith, eds., Mexico's Alternative Political Futures, Monograph Series, no. 30 (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego).

54. Allan de Janvry and Raul Garcia, "Rural Poverty and Environmental Degradation in Latin America" (manuscript, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California at Berkeley, 1988), 7; see also Salvado, The Other Refugees.

55. George Collier, Daniel Mountjoy, and Ron Nigh, "Peasant Agriculture and Global Change: A Maya Response to Energy Development in Southeastern Mexico," Bioscience 44, no. 6: 406; Collier, "The Toll of Restructuring on Lives and Communities," in Basta!, 107-24.

56. See Patricia Gomez Cruz and Christina Maria Kovic, Con un Pueblo Vivo en Tierra Negada (San Cristobal, Chiapas: Centro de Derechos Humanos, 1994), for a detailed account of the marches, land occupations, detentions, assassinations, demands for state assistance, and conflict among campesinos generated from agricultural conflicts; see Carlos Heredia and Mary Purcell, The Polarization of Mexican Society (Mexico, D.F.: Equipo Pueblo, 1994), for a general account of social friction in Mexican agriculture; see the epilogue of Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land a Poor People (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), on how the PRI and landowning elites cooperate against peasants in Chiapas.

57. Harvey, "Rural Reforms," 22.

58. See Nora Lustig, Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992).

59. Burbach and Rosset estimate that by 1983, 30 percent of the states ejidos were controlled by large land owners, "Chiapas and the Crisis of Mexican Agriculture," 6.

60. Statewide, a significant amount of land has been redistributed since the Revolution. Although this redistribution has produced a large statistical reduction in the level of land concentration, as we have noted in this paper, the majority of the land distributed has been of inferior quality, allowing persistently high concentrations of the most ecologically robust land.

61. In response to widespread peasant opposition to the new Agrarian Law, the PRI regime compromised, first, by permitting some further land redistribution and, second, by keeping the existing land appeals process in place for an interim period. As of 1994, almost two thousand unresolved land claims - 30 percent of those filed in all of Mexico - were for tracts of land in Chiapas.

62. Harvey, "Playing with Fire," 23.

63. Vallagran, "Forest Policies in Chiapas." Calculating deforestation rates is often difficult, because definitions of what is meant by a "logged" region vary and because the contribution of forest regeneration to overall forest size is rarely taken into account.

64. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," 25, 27.

65. See William Ford and John Moore, "Additional Evidence on the Social Characteristics of Riot Cities," Social Science Quarterly 51, no. 2 (September 1970): 339-48, and Robert Jiobu, "City Characteristics and Racial Violence," Social Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (June 1974): 52-64.

66. See Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

67. See James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), 1-11.

68. See Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma: The Political Origins of Economic Crisis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

69. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," 26-27.

70. See Maria Luisa Tarres, "Middle-Class Associations and Electoral Opposition," in Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, eds. Ann Craig and Joe Foweraker (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990).

71. George Collier, "The New Politics of Exclusion: Antecedents to the Rebellion in Mexico," Dialectical Anthropology 19, no. 1: 1-44.

72. See Christian Anglade and Carlos Fortin, "Accumulation, Adjustment and the Autonomy of the State in Latin America," in State and Capital Accumulation (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1985).

73. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

74. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security 16, no. 2 (1991): 110-11.

75. Father Pablo Romo Cedano, Diocese of San Cristobal, Personal communication, 4 April 1995.

76. See "Protestant Evangelization," in Collier, Basta!

77. Harvey, "Playing with Fire," 21.

78. On the radicalization of peasants in eastern Chiapas, see "The Building of Social Movements," in Collier, Basta! and Harvey, "Rural Reforms," and on the growth of social movements on rural reform, see Jonathan Fox, The Politics of Food in Mexico (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

79. Subcomandante Marcos, La Jornada, 7 February 1994.

80. In some places in the Lacandon, indigenas and campesinos, with the support of local nongovernmental organizations, have successfully maintained the rain forest and generated some income for their communities through agroforestry projects that cultivate organic crops within secondary forests. Agricultura Organica and Dana, A.C., Productive Reforestation: A Cooperative Project with the Lacandon Rainforest Community (1995).

81. See Collier, Fields of the Tzotzil; Nations, "The Ecology of the Zapatista Revolt," 31-33; and Victor M. Toledo, "The Ecology of Indian Campesinos," Akwe:kon - Journal of Indigenous Issues 11, no. 2 (summer 1994): 41-46.

82. For a survey of the literature supporting this claim, see Anglade and Fortin, "Accumulation, Adjustment and the Autonomy of the State," 211-26.

83. See Juan M. R. Siaz, "Urban Struggles and Their Political Consequences," in Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico, eds. Craig et al.

84. If "Chiapas is Mexico," as some have argued, in that environmental scarcities are appearing in other southern states, such as Oaxaca and Guerrero, and in that vast portions of central Mexico, including Puebla, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Michoacan suffer similar neglect, the PRI can expect to receive demands from insurgent groups similar to those of the EZLN (see Reding, "Chiapas Is Mexico."). As in Chiapas, ejido titles throughout Mexico are often to land that is "marginal, hilly, eroded or otherwise not suitable for permanent agriculture" (Billie Dewalt et al., "The End of the Agrarian Reform in Mexico: Past Lessons, Future Prospects," Transformation of Rural Mexico 3 [La Jolla, Calif.: Ejido Reform Research Project, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1994], 45). For studies of environmental scarcities in Chiapas and the prospects for other parts of Mexico, see Steven E. Sanderson, "Mexico's Environmental Future," Current History, February 1993; Dewalt et al., "The End of the Agrarian Reform in Mexico"; and Burbach and Rosset, "Chiapas and the Crisis of Mexican Agriculture."

85. George Phillip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics (Basingstoke, U.K.: MacMillan, 1992), 174.

86. The plebiscite, run entirely by volunteers in local committees, collected almost 1 million votes from around Mexico and over 80,000 votes internationally. A strong majority encouraged the EZLN to become an independent political party, a transition that is just beginning.

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