Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Securing Radioactive Sources:
A G8 Statement
Evian, June 2, 2003
At Kananaskis, we, the Heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialised democracies and the Representatives of the European Union, endorsed six principles and launched the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Today, at Evian, in another concrete demonstration of our commitment to theses principles, we have agreed to improve the security of radioactive materials. Radioactive sources are found in everyday life and have beneficial applications in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. Certain poorly protected sources pose a real threat because they could be manipulated by terrorists to construct a radiological dispersion device or a " dirty bomb ". We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end.
We welcome the findings of the 2003 Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement the IAEA's activities as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists. The Group of Eight will:
1. Identify elements of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources.
2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. Those elements may include, as necessary:
2.1. National registers for tracking sources;
2.2. Programs for recovering orphan sources;
>2.3. National regulations limiting export of high-risk sources to States that have effective controls;
2.4. Notification requirements to recipient States of exports;
2.5. National measures to penalise theft or misuse of radioactive sources;
2.6. National physical protection measures and access controls;and
2.7. National laws to ensure the safe and secure disposal of high-risk spent sealed sources.
3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004.
4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved.
5. Enhance international co-operation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources.
6. Support and advance the IAEA's programs to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application.
7. In conjunction with the IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to further discuss and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources.
8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action, as set out in the technical annex to this Statement, at the 2004 G8 Summit.
Source: Official Evian G8 website